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Abstract This paper addresses Henig efficiency of a multi-product network equilibrium
model based on Wardrop’s principle. We show that in both the single and multiple criteria
cases, such proper efficiency can be recast as a vector variational inequality. In the multiple
criteria case, we derive a sufficient and a necessary condition for Henig efficiency in terms
of a vector variational inequality by using the Gerstewitz’s function.
1 Introduction
Consider a supply-demand network that comprises some manufacturers and retailers, as
well as some distributing centers or warehouses. For each pair of manufacturer (an origin)
and retailer (a destination), there may exist many paths connecting them. Assume that
we know the supply and demand between each origin-destination (OD) pair. The network
is considered as functioning properly if all the demands are satisfied and all the suppliers
choose one of the paths leading from the point of origin to the point of destination at the
minimum cost. Decision-making problems in management science and operations research
frequently require that decisions are made based on optimizing several criteria. Vector
optimization provides a systemic approach to addressing these problems. Hence, the cost
may comprise multiple criteria, which embraces tariffs, fuels, time and other relevant cost
factors. Such a phenomenon results when the network follows a natural law known as the
user-optimizing principle or the Wardrop’s equilibrium principle (Wardrop (1952)). This
principle asserts that the traffic flow along a path joining an OD pair is positive only if
the cost for this path is the minimum possible amongst all paths joining the same OD
pair. Examples of traffic flow networks that follow the Wardrop’s equilibrium principle
are telephone networks and the Internet.
1Corresponding author. E-Mail: lgtcheng@polyu.edu.hk.
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After Wardrop, many scholars have studied this kind of network equilibrium model
(see, for example, Patriksson and Labbe (2002)). Until only recently, all these equilibrium
models were based on a single criterion. The assumptions that the network users choose
their paths based on a single criterion may not be reasonable under all circumstances.
It is however more reasonable to assume that no user will choose a path that incurs
both a higher cost and a longer delay than some other path. In other words, a vector
equilibrium should be sought based on the principle that the traffic flow along a path
joining an OD pair is positive only if the vector cost of this path is the minimum possible
amongst all paths joining the same OD pair. That is, the cost function is a vector-valued
one. Recently, equilibrium models based on multi-criterion or a vector cost function have
been proposed, such as Chen and Yen (1993), and Chen, Goh and Yang (1999), among
others. The original Wardrop’s equilibrium principle also applies to the case of a network
involving multiple products. Such models were considered by Nagurney and Dong (2002)
and Nagurney (2000).
In many multi-criterion decision-making problems, the common practice is to obtain the
set of efficient decisions, i.e., decisions that are not dominated by any others. Kuhn and
Tucker, and later Geoffrion, observed that a subset of efficient set may be ”improper”.
Practically, this means that points in the subset cannot be satisfactorily characterized
by a scalar minimization problem, even if the decision set is convex. So, the concept of
proper efficiency was introduced by Kuhn-Tucker (1951), Geoffrion (1968), and modified
and formulated into a more general framework by Borwein (1977), Benson (1979), Henig
(1982), and Borwein and Zhuang (1993), among many other researchers. The motivation
for introducing proper efficiency is that it enables one to eliminate certain anomalous
efficient decisions and to prove the existence of equivalent scalar problems whose solutions
produce most of the efficient decisions at least, namely the proper ones. It has been amply
demonstrated that proper efficiency is a natural concept in vector optimization.
In our paper we combine the above three aspects by considering a kind of proper
efficiency – Henig efficiency of a multi-product network equilibrium model with a vector-
valued cost function. We establish a sufficient and a necessary condition for a Henig
equilibrium pattern flow for a multi-product network equilibrium problem in terms of
vector variational inequalities for the single criterion case and the multiple criteria case.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the relation between Henig
efficiency of a multi-product network equilibrium model with a single criterion and a
vector variational inequality is established. In Section 3, we deduce a sufficient and a
necessary condition for Henig efficiency of a multi-product network equilibrium model
with multiple criteria in terms of a vector variational inequality by using Gerstewitz’s
scalarization function, which has never been considered in the literature. We conclude
the paper in Section 4.
2
2 Henig efficiency of a multi-product network equi-
librium model
First of all, we introduce some notations about Henig efficiency. Let Y be a real normed
space ordered by a closed convex cone M ⊂ Y with nonempty interior int M . We denote
the ordering as follows:
x 6 y iff y − x ∈M ;
x < y iff y − x ∈ int M.
A nonempty convex subset P of the convex cone M is called a base of M if M = cone(P )
and 0 /∈ cl(P ), where cl(P ) is the closure of P and cone(P ) is the cone hull of P , i.e.,
cone(P ) := ∪{λa : λ > 0, a ∈ P}.
Denote the closed unit ball of Y by UM . If M has a base P , let
δM := inf {‖a‖ : a ∈ P}
and
Mε(P ) := cl(cone(P + εUM)), ∀ 0 < ε < δM .
By Gong (2001), we know that for any 0 < ε < δM , Mε(P ) is a closed convex pointed
cone and
int M ⊂M \ {0} ⊂ int Mε(P ).
If 0 < ε < ε
′
< δM , then
Mε(P ) ⊂ cone(P + ε′UM) ⊂Mε′ (P ).
A point e∗ ∈ E ⊂ Y is said to be an efficient point of E if e − e∗ /∈ −P \ {0} for any
e ∈ E. By Eff E we denote the set of all the efficient points of E. We also need to
introduce the concept of Henig efficient points of a set E. A point e∗ ∈ E ⊂ Y is said
to be a Henig efficient point of E if e− e∗ /∈ −int Mε(P ) for any e ∈ E and e 6= e∗. We
denote the set of all the Henig efficient points of E by Henig E.
We consider a supply-demand network in which there are q products to traverse in the
network with a typical product denoted by j. Consider a general network G = [N,A, I],
where N denotes the set of nodes representing manufacturers and retailers, as well as
distributing centers and warehouses, and A the set of directed arcs. Let a ∈ A denote an
arc connecting a pair of nodes. Let I denote the set of all the OD pairs associated with
each pair of manufacturer and retailer, and |I| = l. We denote by Ki the set of paths
that connect an OD pair i ∈ I associated with a given pair of manufacturer and retailer
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and let m =
∑
i∈I
|Ki|. Let k ∈ Ki denote a path, assumed to be acyclic, consisting of a
sequence of arcs connecting an OD pair i.
For a path k ∈ Ki, let vjk denote the flow of product j on path k. A path flow vjk induces
a flow vja of product j on an arc a ∈ A given by:
vja =
∑
i∈I
∑
k∈Ki
δakv
j
k,
where
∆ = [δak] ∈ R|A|×m
is the arc path incidence matrix, with
δak = { 1, if a ∈ k
0, otherwise.
A vector vj = (vjk : k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I) such that vjk > 0, ∀k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I, j = 1, 2, · · ·, q, is
said to be a flow of product j on the network and v = (v1, v2, · · ·, vq)T is called a flow of
the network. Let there also be given a vector of demands d = (dji : i ∈ I, j = 1, 2, · · ·, q).
Each component dji indicates the demand of the OD pair i for product j, that is, the
quantity of product j that needs to go from the manufacturer to the retailer associated
with the OD pair i. We say that a flow of the network v satisfies the demands if∑
k∈Ki
vjk = d
j
i , ∀i ∈ I, j = 1, 2, · · ·, q.
Then, the set D = {v : ∑
k∈Ki
vjk = d
j
i , ∀i ∈ I, j = 1, 2, · · ·, q} is the feasible set. D is
clearly a convex set. In fact, for any v, u ∈ D and any λ ∈ [0, 1], we know∑
k∈Ki
vjk = d
j
i ,
∑
k∈Ki
ujk = d
j
i , ∀i ∈ I, j = 1, 2, · · ·, q.
Thus, we have ∑
k∈Ki
λvjk = λd
j
i ,
∑
k∈Ki
(1− λ)ujk = (1− λ)dji .
Hence, ∑
k∈Ki
(λvjk + (1− λ)ujk) = dji , ∀i ∈ I, j = 1, 2, · · ·, q.
That is, λv + (1− λ)u ∈ D. Therefore, D is convex.
The function cja(v) : R
q×m → R+ is interpreted as the cost of product j on an arc a ∈ A.
Then the cost function of product j on a path k (k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I) depending on the flow of
the network is defined by the formula
cjk(v) =
∑
a∈k
cja(v).
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Then, the vector function cj(v) = (cjk(v) : k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I) and c(v) = (c1(v), c2(v), · ·
·, cq(v))T are called the cost function of product j on the network and the cost function
of the network, respectively.
For each i ∈ I, we define the minimum cost function of product j for the OD pair i by
putting
mji (v) = min
k∈Ki
cjk(v).
Set mi(v) = (m
1
i (v),m
2
i (v), · · ·,mqi (v))T and group the q×m matrix v into a q-dimensional
column vector vk (∀ k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I) with components vk = (v1k, v2k, · · ·, vqk)T , where
v = (vk : k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I). Also, group the vector c(v) into a q-dimensional column
vector ck(v), k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I, with components ck(v) = (c1k(v), c2k(v), · · ·, cqk(v))T , where
c(v) = (ck(v) : k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I). For the q-dimensional Euclidean space Rq, by 6 we
denote the ordering induced by Rq+ :
x 6 y iff y − x ∈ Rq+;
x < y iff y − x ∈ int Rq+,
where int Rq+ is the interior of R
q
+. The ordering > and > are defined similarly.
Applying Wardrop’s equilibrium principle (Wardrop (1952)), we see that the equilib-
rium principle (user-optimizing principle) in the generalized context of a multi-product
supply-demand network equilibrium problem takes on the following form.
Definition 2.1. A vector v ∈ D is called an equilibrium pattern flow iff
ck(v)−mi(v) { = 0 if vk ∈ R
q
+ \ {0}
> 0 if vk = 0.
(2.1)
for each i ∈ I and each k ∈ Ki.
The above equilibrium principle involves no explicit optimization concept because the
network users act independently, in a noncooperative manner, until they cannot improve
on their situations unilaterally and, thus, an equilibrium is achieved, governed by the
above equilibrium conditions. Indeed, condition (2.1) means that only those paths con-
necting an OD pair that have minimal user travel costs in terms of vector ordering will
be used. Otherwise, the network users could improve upon their situations by switching
to a path with a lower cost. That is, for any OD pair of manufacturer and retailer i, if
the transportation cost of all the products on a path k ∈ Ki is greater than the minimum
cost of the OD pair i in terms of vector ordering, then the flow of all the products on k
is zero.
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For the sake of convenience, the equilibrium condition (2.1) can be expressed in the
following equivalent form.
Proposition 2.1. (see Cheng and Wu (2005)) The network equilibrium condition (2.1)
is equivalent to the following statement:
cr(v)− ck(v) ∈ Rq+ \ {0} ⇒ vr = 0, (2.2)
for each i ∈ I and any k, r ∈ Ki.
It seems that the left side of (2.2) is defined in a way similar to the definition of strong
efficiency (see Liu and Gong (2000)). We know weak efficiency and strong efficiency are
two kinds of extremal efficiency in vector optimization. Optimality conditions of these
kinds of efficiency are not complete for vector optimization theory. In vector optimization
problems, several notions of proper efficiency have been proposed, in order to rule out
some situations (tolerated by the definition of efficiency) that are hardly meaningful.
Proper efficiency has been introduced in order to get rid of anomalous efficient points.
Next, we introduce a kind of proper efficiency–Henig efficiency of a network equilibrium
model. For simplicity, we replace Rq+ with the notation H. By B and UH , we denote the
base of H and the closed unit ball of Rq, respectively. Thus,
Hε(B) = cl(cone(B + εUH)), ∀ 0 < ε < δH ,
where δH = inf {‖a‖ : a ∈ B}.
Definition 2.2. A vector v ∈ D is called a Henig equilibrium pattern flow iff the following
statement holds:
cr(v)− ck(v) /∈ −(int Hε(B) ∪ {0})⇒ vr = 0,
for each i ∈ I, any k, r ∈ Ki and some 0 < ε < δH .
The cost functions are asymmetric in the model. Such cost functions are very impor-
tant from an application point of view since they allow for asymmetric cost interactions
in the network. However, given the asymmetry of the cost functions, one cannot compute
the solution to the network equilibrium problem using standard optimization algorithms.
Indeed, variational inequality theory provides a feasible approach to studying such prob-
lems.
Variational inequality theory is a powerful tool in the qualitative analysis of equilibria
theory (see, for example, Nagurney (1999)). Now, let us review the concept of vector
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variational inequality. For a vector space Rq×q, the vector variational inequality is:
To find x¯ ∈ B such that 〈T (x¯), x− x¯〉 ∈ Rq×q+ , ∀ x ∈ B,
where T : X → L(X,Rq×q), L(X,Rq×q) is the set of all the linear operators from X into
Rq×q, B is a convex subset of X and X is an abstract space.
Next, we establish a sufficient and a necessary conditions for Henig efficiency of a net-
work equilibrium problem with multiple products in terms of vector variational inequality
problems. Specifically, we wish to prove the following two theorems.
Theorem 2.1. Let a vector flow v ∈ D be a Henig equilibrium pattern flow. Then v is
a solution to the vector variational inequality: to find v ∈ D such that
〈c(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int Rq×q+ , ∀ u ∈ D.
Proof. Let a vector flow v ∈ D be a Henig equilibrium pattern flow for a multi-product
supply-demand network equilibrium problem. By Definition 2.2, we have the following
statement:
cr(v)− ck(v) /∈ −(int Hε(B) ∪ {0})⇒ vr = 0,
for each i ∈ I and any k, r ∈ Ki.
For any u ∈ D, we have
〈c(v), (u− v)T 〉
=(c1(v), c2(v), · · ·, cm(v))(u1 − v1, u2 − v2, · · ·, um − vm)T
=
m∑
t=1
ct(v)(ut − vt)T
=
l∑
i=1
[
∑
t∈Ki
ct(v)(ut − vt)T ].
We know ct(v)(ut − vt)T is a q × q matrix whose components are cαt (v)(uβt − vβt ), where
α, β = 1, 2, · · ·, q. Hence, 〈c(v), (u − v)T 〉 is also a q × q matrix whose components are
l∑
i=1
[
∑
t∈Ki
cαt (v)(u
β
t − vβt )], where α, β = 1, 2, · · ·, q.
Set
Ji(v) := {r¯ ∈ Ki : cr¯(v) ∈ Henig{ck(v) : k ∈ Ki}} ⊂ Ki.
Then, for any r¯ ∈ Ji(v) ⊂ Ki,
ck(v)− cr¯(v) /∈ −(int Hε(B) ∪ {0}), ∀ k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I and k 6= r¯.
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By Definition 2.2, we have vk = 0 for any k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I and k 6= r¯. Thus, we obtain
l∑
i=1
[
∑
t∈Ki
cαt (v)(u
β
t − vβt )]
=
l∑
i=1
[
∑
t∈Ki\{r¯}
cαt (v)(u
β
t − vβt ) + cαr¯ (v)(uβr¯ − vβr¯ )]
=
l∑
i=1
[
∑
t∈Ki\{r¯}
cαt (v)u
β
t + c
α
r¯ (v)(u
β
r¯ − vβr¯ )]
=
l∑
i=1
[
∑
t∈Ki
cαt (v)u
β
t − cαr¯ (v)vβr¯ ]
>
l∑
i=1
[mαi (v)
∑
t∈Ki
uβt − cαr¯ (v)vβr¯ ]
=
l∑
i=1
[mαi (v)d
β
i − cαr¯ (v)vβr¯ ].
Since v ∈ D, by vk = 0 for any k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I and k 6= r¯ we know∑
t∈Ki
vβk =
∑
t∈Ki\{r¯}
vβk + v
β
r¯ = v
β
r¯ = d
β
i .
Hence, we have
l∑
i=1
[
∑
t∈Ki
cαt (v)(u
β
t − vβt )]
>
l∑
i=1
[mαi (v)d
β
i − cαr¯ (v)dβi ]
=
l∑
i=1
dβi [m
α
i (v)− cαr¯ (v)]. (2.3)
For any r¯ ∈ Ji(v), by Liu and Gong (2000), we know cr¯(v) ∈ Eff{ck(v) : k ∈ Ki}. That
is,
ck(v)− cr¯(v) /∈ −H \ {0}), ∀ k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I.
It means that there exists an α¯ ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q} such that
cα¯k (v)− cα¯r¯ (v) > 0, ∀ k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I.
That is,
mα¯i (v) = c
α¯
r¯ (v).
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Hence, from (2.3), we derive that there exists an α¯ ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q} such that
l∑
i=1
[
∑
t∈Ki
cα¯t (v)(u
β
t − vβt )] > 0.
Thus, we obtain
〈c(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int Rq×q+ , ∀ u ∈ D.
The proof is completed. 
Theorem 2.2. A vector flow v ∈ D is a Henig equilibrium pattern flow if v is a solution
to the vector variational inequality: to find v ∈ D such that
〈c(v), (u− v)T 〉 ∈ Rq×q+ , ∀ u ∈ D.
Proof. Suppose that v ∈ D is a solution to the following variational inequality:
〈c(v), (u− v)T 〉 ∈ Rq×q+ , ∀ u ∈ D.
Also, assume that cr(v) − ck(v) /∈ −(int Hε(B) ∪ {0}) for any i ∈ I and k, r ∈ Ki. We
want to deduce that vr = 0.
We consider the vector u whose components are such that
ut = {
vt if t 6= r, k
0 if t = r
vr + vk if t = k.
Since v ∈ D, i.e., ∑
t∈Ki
vjt = d
j
i for any i ∈ I and any j = 1, 2, · · ·, q, we have∑
t∈Ki
ujt =
∑
t∈Ki\{r,k}
ujt + u
j
r + u
j
k
=
∑
t∈Ki\{r,k}
vjt + 0 + v
j
r + v
j
k
=
∑
t∈Ki
vjt
= dji .
So, u ∈ D. By the above proof, we know
〈c(v), (u− v)T 〉
=
m∑
t=1
ct(v)(ut − vt)T
=
∑
t6=r,k
ct(v)(vt − vt)T − cr(v)vTr + ck(v)vTr
=(ck(v)− cr(v))vTr ∈ Rq×q+ .
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It is easy to see that 〈c(v), (u − v)T 〉 is a q × q matrix whose components are (cαk (v) −
cαr (v))v
β
r , where α, β = 1, 2, · · ·, q. So, we obtain
(cαk (v)− cαr (v))vβr > 0, ∀ α, β = 1, 2, · · ·, q. (2.4)
If vr 6= 0, there exists a β¯ ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q} such that vβ¯r > 0. Since cr(v) − ck(v) /∈
−(int Hε(B) ∪ {0}), we know
cr(v)− ck(v) /∈ −int Hε(B)
and
cr(v)− ck(v) 6= 0. (2.5)
By −H \ {0} ⊂ −int Hε(B), we have cr(v)− ck(v) /∈ −H \ {0}. Combining with (2.5), it
holds that
cr(v)− ck(v) /∈ −H.
That is, there too exists an α¯ ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q} such that cα¯k (v)− cα¯r (v) < 0. Hence,
(cα¯k (v)− cα¯r (v))vβ¯r < 0.
It is a contradiction to (2.4). Therefore, vr = 0.
We complete the proof. 
3 Network equilibrium problem with multi-product
products and multi-criterion
The assumption that the network users choose their paths based on a single criterion
may not be reasonable on all occasions. For example, if a path has a rough surface or is
noted for its unsafe road conditions such as ice in winter, users may pay more attention
to transportation time than cost. However, on a general road, they would rather incur
less transportation cost than spend more time. It is more reasonable to assume that no
user will choose a path that incurs both a higher cost and a longer delay than some other
path. Therefore, the cost function is a vector-valued one. In Chen and Yen (1993), a
multi-criterion traffic equilibrium model was proposed, but no attempt was made to solve
the equilibrium problem. Other papers that have considered multi-criterion equilibrium
models are Chen, Goh and Yang (1999), and Yang and Goh (1997), among others.
Let Z be a Hausdorff topological vector space ordered by a pointed, closed convex
cone S ⊂ Z with nonempty interior int S. For the network G = [N,A, I], if we define
the cost function of product j on an arc a ∈ A as a vector-valued function of the flow
v : Cja(v) : R
q×m → Z and Cja(v) > 0, then the cost function Cjk(v) of product j
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on a path k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I, is also a vector-valued function, which is defined as above:
Cjk(v) =
∑
a∈k
Cja(v). The vector-valued function C
j(v) = (Cjk(v) : k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I) ∈ Zm
and Ck(v) = (C
1
k(v), C
2
k(v), · · ·, Cqk(v))T ∈ Zq are the cost function of product j in the
network and the cost function on the path k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I, respectively. Then, the vector-
valued cost function of the network is C(v) = (C1(v), C2(v), · · ·, Cq(v))T ∈ Zq×m or
C(v) = (Ck(v) : k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I).
In this section we consider Z as a finite-dimensional Euclidean space Rp with the special
ordering cone S = Rp+, which is more realistic than an abstract topological vector space
from a practical viewpoint. Also, we replace Rq×p+ with the notation L. By T and UL we
denote the base of L and the closed unit ball of Rq×p, respectively. Thus,
Lε(T ) = cl(cone(T + εUL)), ∀ 0 < ε < δL,
where δL = inf {‖b‖ : b ∈ T}. Now we can generalize Wardrop’s equilibrium principle to
a multi-product supply-demand network equilibrium problem with a vector-valued cost
function with respect to Henig efficiency.
Definition 3.1. A vector v ∈ D is said to be a Henig equilibrium pattern flow in the
generalized context of a multi-product supply-demand network equilibrium problem with
a vector-valued cost function iff
Cr(v)− Ck(v) /∈ −(int Lε(T ) ∪ {0})⇒ vr = 0,
for each i ∈ I, any k, r ∈ Ki and some 0 < ε < δL.
A useful approach to analyzing the vector-valued problem is to reduce it to a scalarized
problem. In general, the linear scalarization method appears to be popular. But such
kind of methods rely heavily on some underlying convexity assumptions, which are hardly
valid for many real problems. In our paper, by using Gerstewitz’s function (see Chen,
Goh and Yang (1999)), we develop another scalarization method for the vector-valued
Wardrop’s network equilibrium problem without any convexity assumptions.
Definition 3.2. Given a fixed e ∈ int Rp+, the Gerstewitz’s function ξe : Rp → R is
defined by:
ξe(y) = min{λ ∈ R : y ∈ λe−Rp+}, ∀ y ∈ Rp.
We note that this function was used in Gerth and Weidner (1990) to establish a useful
non-convex separation theorem. Obviously, there are some salient properties of this func-
tion that we will use later.
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Lemma 3.1. (see Chen and Yang (2002)) Let e ∈ int Rp+, then ξ is positively homoge-
neous and subadditive on Rp. That is, for any µ > 0, y, z ∈ Rp,
ξe(µy) = µξe(y);
ξe(y + z) 6 ξe(y) + ξe(z).
Lemma 3.2. (also see Chen and Yang (2002)) Let e ∈ int Rp+. For each η ∈ R and
y ∈ Rp, we have the following results:
(i) ξe (y) < η ⇔ y ∈ ηe− int Rp+;
(ii) ξe (y) 6 η ⇔ y ∈ ηe−Rp+;
(iii) ξe (y) > η ⇔ y /∈ ηe− int Rp+;
(iv) ξe (y) > η ⇔ y /∈ ηe−Rp+;
(v) ξe (y) = η ⇔ y ∈ ηe− ∂Rp+, where ∂Rp+ is the topological boundary of Rp+.
Lemma 3.3. (see Cheng and Wu (2005)) Let e ∈ int Rp+. For any y ∈ Rp, we have
ξe(−y) > −ξe(y).
Then, for any η ∈ R,
ξe(−ηy) > −ξe(ηy).
Lemma 3.4. (also see Cheng and Wu (2005)) For an e ∈ int Rp+ and η ∈ R,
ξe(−ηe) = −ξe(ηe) = −η.
Similar to Section 2, we want to find an equivalence relation between Henig efficiency
of a vector-valued network equilibrium problem with multiple products and a vector vari-
ational inequality. Since we have proved that the necessary and sufficient conditions for
a vector flow v ∈ D to be an equilibrium pattern flow in a scalar-valued network equi-
librium problem are that it is a solution to a vector variational inequality in Theorem
2.1, by applying the Gerstewitz’s function, we suppose that the equivalence relation must
hold between the vector-valued network equilibrium problem and the vector variational
inequality without any convexity assumptions. We prove this result in the following.
First, we denote
ξe ◦ Cjk(v) = ξe(Cjk(v)) = min{λ ∈ R : Cjk(v) ∈ λe−Rp+},
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for any v ∈ D, k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I, j = 1, 2, · · ·, q;
ξe ◦ Ck(v) = (ξe ◦ Cjk(v) : j = 1, 2, · · ·, q)T ∈ Rq;
and
ξe(v) = ξe ◦ C(v) = (ξe ◦ Ck(v) : k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I) ∈ Rq×m.
Definition 3.3. A vector v ∈ D is said to be an ξe-Henig equilibrium pattern flow in
a vector-valued network equilibrium problem with multiple products if there exists an
e ∈ int Rp+ such that
ξe ◦ Cr(v)− ξe ◦ Ck(v) /∈ −(int Hε(B) ∪ {0})⇒ vr = 0,
for each i ∈ I, any k, r ∈ Ki and some 0 < ε < δH .
Set Cjk(v) : R
q×m → Rp+ in the following form:
Cjk(v) = f
j
k(v)k0, ∀ k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I and j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q}. (3.1)
where f jk(v) : R
q×m → R+ and k0 ∈ int Rp+. It is realistic from a practical viewpoint
since the transportation cost function is made up of elementary costs. We see that k0
is a vector of elementary costs, i.e., it is vector-valued, and each Cjk(v) is its real-valued
multiple, i.e., the multiple f jk(v) is a real-valued function of flow v.
Now we will scalarize the vector-valued network equilibrium problem with multiple
products. It is important to note that we do not require any convexity assumptions since
we use Gerstewitz’s function in our scalarization method.
Theorem 3.1. Let Cjk(v) be defined as (3.1) for all k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I and j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q}.
A vector v ∈ D is a Henig equilibrium pattern flow in the generalized context of a multi-
product supply-demand network equilibrium problem with a vector-valued cost function
if and only if v is an ξk0-Henig equilibrium pattern flow in a vector-valued network equi-
librium problem with multiple products.
Proof. Necessity: Let v ∈ D be a Henig equilibrium pattern flow in the generalized
context of a multi-product supply-demand network equilibrium problem with a vector-
valued cost function. That is, for some 0 < ε < δL,
Cr(v)− Ck(v) /∈ −(int Lε(T ) ∪ {0})⇒ vr = 0, (3.2)
for each i ∈ I and any k, r ∈ Ki. Next we will prove for a j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q},
ξk0(C
j
k(v))− ξk0(Cjr (v)) < 0
Cr(v)− Ck(v) 6= 0
} ⇒ Cr(v)− Ck(v) /∈ −(int Lε(T ) ∪ {0}).
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By (3.1) and Lemma 3.4, we obtain
ξk0(C
j
k(v))− ξk0(Cjr (v)) = ξk0(Cjk(v)− Cjr (v)) = f jk(v)− f jr (v).
Hence, we get
ξk0(C
j
k(v))− ξk0(Cjr (v)) < 0⇒ ξk0(Cjk(v)− Cjr (v)) < 0.
By Lemma 3.2, we get
Cjk(v)− Cjr (v) ∈ −int Rp+.
Thus,
Ck(v)− Cr(v) /∈ Rq×p+ = L. (3.3)
If not, it holds that
Cjk(v)− Cjr (v) ∈ Rp+, ∀ j = 1, 2, · · ·, q.
We assume that for any ε ∈ (0, δL),
Cr(v)− Ck(v) ∈ −int Lε(T ). (3.4)
We know that Lε(T ) = cone(T + εU). By Gong (2001), L \ {0} ⊂ Lε(T ) ⊂ Lε′ (T ), if
0 < ε < ε
′
< δL. Hence, by the arbitrariness of ε ∈ (0, δL) in (3.4), we deduce
Cr(v)− Ck(v) ∈ −L \ {0}.
That is,
Ck(v)− Cr(v) ∈ L \ {0}.
It is a contradiction to (3.3). So, we see that for some ε ∈ (0, δL),
Cr(v)− Ck(v) /∈ −(int Lε(T ) ∪ {0}).
Thus, by (3.2) it holds that for an e ∈ int Rp+ and a j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q},
ξk0(C
j
k(v))− ξk0(Cjr (v)) < 0,
Cr(v)− Ck(v) 6= 0
} ⇒ vr = 0,
for each i ∈ I and any k, r ∈ Ki.
If v is not an ξk0-Henig equilibrium pattern flow for a vector-valued network equilibrium
problem with multiple products, then there exists an i¯ ∈ I and a pair of k¯, r¯ ∈ Ki¯ satisfying
ξk0◦Cr¯(v)−ξk0◦Ck¯(v) /∈ −(int Hε(B)∪{0}) such that vr¯ 6= 0. By ξk0◦Cr¯(v)−ξk0◦Ck¯(v) /∈
−(int Hε(B) ∪ {0}), we know that Cr¯(v)− Ck¯(v) 6= 0 and
ξk0 ◦ Cr¯(v)− ξk0 ◦ Ck¯(v) /∈ −int Hε(B).
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Since H \ {0} ⊂ int Hε(B), we obtain
ξk0 ◦ Cr¯(v)− ξk0 ◦ Ck¯(v) /∈ −H \ {0}.
Since ξk0 ◦ Cr¯(v)− ξk0 ◦ Ck¯(v) 6= 0, we see that there exists j¯ such that
ξk0(C
j¯
r¯ (v))− ξk0(C j¯k¯(v)) > 0.
Combining with Cr¯(v)−Ck¯(v) 6= 0, we obtain vr¯ = 0. It is a contradiction. So v is also an
ξk0-Henig equilibrium pattern flow in a vector-valued network equilibrium problem with
multiple products.
Sufficiency: Suppose that v is an ξk0-Henig equilibrium pattern flow for a vector-valued
network equilibrium problem with multiple products. That is, for some ε ∈ (0, δH),
ξk0 ◦ Cr(v)− ξk0 ◦ Ck(v) /∈ −(int Hε(B) ∪ {0})⇒ vr = 0,
for each i ∈ I and any k, r ∈ Ki. Next, we will prove that for a j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q},
ξk0(C
j
r (v))− ξk0(Cjk(v)) > 0
Cr(v)− Ck(v) 6= 0
} ⇒ ξk0 ◦ Cr(v)− ξk0 ◦ Ck(v) /∈ −(int Hε(B) ∪ {0}).
It is easy to see that ξk0 ◦Cr(v)− ξk0 ◦Ck(v) 6= 0. So, we only need to prove ξk0 ◦Cr(v)−
ξk0 ◦Ck(v) /∈ −int Hε(B). We assume that for any ε ∈ (0, δH), ξk0 ◦Cr(v)− ξk0 ◦Ck(v) ∈
−int Hε(B). By an analogous analysis with the proof of Necessary, we derive
ξk0 ◦ Cr(v)− ξk0 ◦ Ck(v) ∈ −H \ {0}.
That is, for any j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q}, it holds that
ξk0(C
j
r (v))− ξk0(Cjk(v)) 6 0.
It is a contradiction to ξk0(C
j
r (v)) − ξk0(Cjk(v)) > 0. Thus, we obtain that for some
ε ∈ (0, δH),
ξk0 ◦ Cr(v)− ξk0 ◦ Ck(v) /∈ −int Hε(B).
Hence, we deduce that for a j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q},
ξk0(C
j
r (v))− ξk0(Cjk(v)) > 0
Cr(v)− Ck(v) 6= 0
} ⇒ ξk0 ◦ Cr(v)− ξk0 ◦ Ck(v) /∈ −(int Hε(B) ∪ {0}).
Thus, we also deduce that for a j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q},
ξk0(C
j
r (v))− ξk0(Cjk(v)) > 0
Cr(v)− Ck(v) 6= 0
} ⇒ vr = 0 (3.5)
for each i ∈ I and any k, r ∈ Ki.
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If for any i ∈ I and k, r ∈ Ki, Cr(v)− Ck(v) /∈ −(int Lε(T ) ∪ {0}), we want to derive
vr = 0. By Cr(v)− Ck(v) /∈ −(int Lε(T ) ∪ {0}), we know Cr(v)− Ck(v) 6= 0 and
Cr(v)− Ck(v) /∈ −int Lε(T ).
Since int L ⊂ L \ {0} \ int Lε(T ), we obtain
Cr(v)− Ck(v) /∈ −L.
That is, there exists a j¯ ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q} such that
C j¯r (v)− C j¯k(v) /∈ −Rp+.
Thus, by Lemma 3.2, we obtain
ξk0(C
j¯
r (v)− C j¯k(v)) > 0.
By (3.1) and Lemma 3.4, it holds that
ξk0(C
j¯
r (v))− ξk0(C j¯k(v)) > 0.
Hence, by (3.5), we know vr = 0. Therefore, v ∈ D is a Henig equilibrium pattern flow in
the generalized context of a multi-product supply-demand network equilibrium problem
with a vector-valued cost function. 
From Theorem 2.1, we obtain the following two corollaries.
Corollary 3.1. Let Cjk(v) be defined as (3.1) for all k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I and j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q}.
If a vector flow v ∈ D is a Henig equilibrium pattern flow in the generalized context of
a multi-product supply-demand network equilibrium problem with a vector-valued cost
function, then v is a solution to a vector variational inequality: to find v ∈ D such that
〈ξk0(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int Rq×q+ , ∀ u ∈ D.
Corollary 3.2. Let Cjk(v) be defined as (3.1) for all k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I and j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q}.
A vector flow v ∈ D is a Henig equilibrium pattern flow in the generalized context of
a multi-product supply-demand network equilibrium problem with a vector-valued cost
function if v is a solution to a vector variational inequality: to find v ∈ D such that
〈ξk0(v), (u− v)T 〉 ∈ Rq×q+ , ∀ u ∈ D.
We know that the Gerstewitz’s function is difficult to compute. So the best way to
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proceed is to convert two vector variational inequality above to the following vector forms:
to find v ∈ D such that
〈C(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int (Rp+)q×q, ∀ u ∈ D.
and to find v ∈ D such that
〈C(v), (u− v)T 〉 ∈ (Rp+)q×q, ∀ u ∈ D.
In Cheng and Wu (2005), they proved the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Let Cjk(v) be defined as (3.1) for all k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I and j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q}.
v ∈ D is a solution to the following vector variational inequality:
finding v ∈ D such that
〈ξk0(v), (u− v)T 〉 ∈ Rq×q+ , ∀ u ∈ D,
if and only if v is also a solution to vector variational inequality:
〈C(v), (u− v)T 〉 ∈ (Rp+)q×q, ∀ u ∈ D.
Now we prove another equivalent relation.
Theorem 3.3. If v ∈ D is the solution to the vector variational inequality: finding v ∈ D
such that
〈C(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int (Rp+)q×q, ∀ u ∈ D,
then v is also a solution to the following vector variational inequality: finding v ∈ D such
that for an e ∈ int Rp+,
〈ξe(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int Rq×q+ , ∀ u ∈ D.
Proof. For any u ∈ D, we know that 〈C(v), (u − v)T 〉 =
m∑
t=1
Ct(v)(ut − vt)T . By the
above proof, it is a q × q matrix whose components are
m∑
t=1
[Cαt (v)(u
β
t − vβt )] ∈ Rp, where
α, β = 1, 2, · · ·, q. Since 〈C(v), (u − v)T 〉 /∈ −int (Rp+)q×q, we obtain that there exist
α¯, β¯ ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q} such that
m∑
t=1
[C α¯t (v)(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t )] /∈ −int Rp+, ∀ u ∈ D.
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By Lemma 3.2 we obtain
ξe(
m∑
t=1
[C α¯t (v)(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t )]) > 0, ∀ u ∈ D.
By Lemma 3.1, it holds that
m∑
t=1
[ξe(C
α¯
t (v)(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t ))] > 0, ∀ u ∈ D.
For any given u ∈ D, set
N1 = {t ∈ {1, 2, · · ·,m} : uβ¯t − vβ¯t > 0}
and
N2 = {t ∈ {1, 2, · · ·,m} : uβ¯t − vβ¯t < 0}.
Therefore, |N1| + |N2| = m, and the following formula also holds by Lemma 3.1 and
Lemma 3.3:
m∑
t=1
[ξe(C
α¯
t (v)(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t ))]
=
∑
t∈N1
[ξe(C
α¯
t (v)(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t ))] +
∑
t∈N2
[ξe(C
α¯
t (v)(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t ))]
>
∑
t∈N1
[(ξe(C
α¯
t (v)))(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t )]−
∑
t∈N2
[(ξe(C
α¯
t (v)))(v
β¯
t − uβ¯t )]
=
∑
t∈N1
[(ξe(C
α¯
t (v)))(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t )] +
∑
t∈N2
[(ξe(C
α¯
t (v)))(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t )]
=
m∑
t=1
[(ξe(C
α¯
t (v)))(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t )]
> 0. (3.6)
We also know for an e ∈ int Rp+,
〈ξe(v), (u− v)T 〉 =
m∑
t=1
[(ξe ◦ Ct(v))(ut − vt)T ].
It is also a q × q matrix whose components are
m∑
t=1
[(ξe(C
α
t (v)))(u
β
t − vβt )] ∈ R, α, β =
1, 2, · · ·, q. We assume that there exists a u¯ ∈ D such that 〈ξe(v), (u¯− v)T 〉 ∈ −int Rq×q+ ,
i.e., for any α, β ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q} we have
m∑
t=1
[(ξe(C
α
t (v)))(u¯
β
t − vβt )] < 0.
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This contadicts (3.6). Therefore, we obtain
〈ξe(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int Rq×q+ , ∀ u ∈ D. 
Next, we deduce Theorem 3.4.
Theorem 3.4. Let Cjk(v) be defined as (3.1) for all k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I and j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q}.
If v ∈ D is a solution to the vector variational inequality: finding v ∈ D such that
〈ξk0(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int Rq×q+ , ∀ u ∈ D,
then v is also a solution to the following vector variational inequality:
〈C(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int (Rp+)q×q, ∀ u ∈ D.
Proof. For any u ∈ D, since 〈ξk0(v), (u − v)T 〉 is a q × q matrix whose components are
m∑
t=1
[(ξk0(C
α
t (v)))(u
β
t − vβt )] (α, β = 1, 2, · · ·, q), by 〈ξk0(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int Rq×q+ , we know
that there exist α¯, β¯ ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q} such that
m∑
t=1
[(ξk0(C
α¯
t (v)))(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t )] > 0, ∀ u ∈ D.
Similar to the proof above, we group the set {1, 2, · · ·, q} into two parts, N1 and N2, where
N1 = {t ∈ {1, 2, · · ·,m} : uβ¯t − vβ¯t > 0},
and
N2 = {t ∈ {1, 2, · · ·,m} : uβ¯t − vβ¯t < 0},
for any given u ∈ D. Then, by Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.3,
m∑
t=1
[(ξk0(C
α¯
t (v)))(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t )]
=
∑
t∈N1
[(ξk0(C
α¯
t (v)))(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t )] +
∑
t∈N2
[(ξk0(C
α¯
t (v)))(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t )]
=
∑
t∈N1
[ξk0(C
α¯
t (v)(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t ))] +
∑
t∈N2
[−ξk0(C α¯t (v)(vβ¯t − uβ¯t ))]
6
∑
t∈N1
[ξk0(C
α¯
t (v)(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t ))] +
∑
t∈N2
[ξk0(C
α¯
t (v)(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t ))]
=
m∑
t=1
[ξk0(C
α¯
t (v)(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t ))].
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Therefore,
m∑
t=1
[ξk0(C
α¯
t (v)(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t ))] > 0, ∀ u ∈ D.
By Cαt (v) = f
α
t (v)k0 and Lemma 3.4, for all u ∈ D, we get
m∑
t=1
[ξk0(f
α¯
t (v)k0(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t ))]
=
m∑
t=1
[f α¯t (v)(u
β¯
t − vβ¯t )]
> 0. (3.7)
If there exists a u¯ ∈ D such that
〈C(v), (u¯− v)T 〉 ∈ −int (Rp+)q×q,
i.e., for any α, β ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q}, we obtain that the component of 〈C(v), (u¯−v)T 〉 belongs
to −int Rp+, i.e.,
m∑
t=1
[Cαt (v)(u¯
β
t − vβt )] ∈ −int Rp+.
By Lemma 3.2,
ξk0(
m∑
t=1
[Cαt (v)(u¯
β
t − vβt )]) < 0.
By Cαt (v) = f
α
t (v)k0 and Lemma 3.4, we obtain
ξk0(
m∑
t=1
[Cαt (v)(u¯
β
t − vβt )])
=ξk0(k0
m∑
t=1
(fαt (v)(u¯
β
t − vβt ))
=
m∑
t=1
(fαt (v)(u¯
β
t − vβt ))
< 0.
This is a contradiction to (3.7). Therefore, for any u ∈ D,
〈C(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int (Rp+)q×q.
The proof is completed. 
Corollary 3.3. Let Cjk(v) be defined as (3.1) for all k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I and j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q}.
v ∈ D is a solution to the vector variational inequality: finding v ∈ D such that
〈ξk0(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int Rq×q+ , ∀ u ∈ D,
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if and only if v is also a solution to the following vector variational inequality:
〈C(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int (Rp+)q×q, ∀ u ∈ D.
Combining with Corollary 3.1, Corollary 3.2 and Theorem 3.2 above, we have derived
the following Theorem 3.5 and Theorem 3.6.
Theorem 3.5. Let Cjk(v) be defined as (3.1) for all k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I and j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q}.
If a vector flow v ∈ D is a Henig equilibrium pattern flow in the generalized context of
a multi-product supply-demand network equilibrium problem with a vector-valued cost
function, then v is a solution to a vector variational inequality: to find v ∈ D such that
〈C(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int (Rp+)q×q, ∀ u ∈ D.
Theorem 3.6. Let Cjk(v) be defined as (3.1) for all k ∈ Ki, i ∈ I and j ∈ {1, 2, · · ·, q}.
A vector flow v ∈ D is a Henig equilibrium pattern flow in the generalized context of
a multi-product supply-demand network equilibrium problem with a vector-valued cost
function if v is a solution to a vector variational inequality: to find v ∈ D such that
〈C(v), (u− v)T 〉 ∈ (Rp+)q×q, ∀ u ∈ D.
It is instructive to summarize all of the relations we have derived so far. We denote
them by (i)∼(vi):
(i) v ∈ D is an ξk0-Henig equilibrium pattern flow in a vector-valued network equilibrium
problem with multiple products;
(ii) v ∈ D is a Henig equilibrium pattern flow in the generalized context of a multi-
product supply-demand network equilibrium problem with a vector-valued cost function;
(iii) v ∈ D is a solution to the vector variational inequality: finding v ∈ D such that
〈ξk0(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int Rq×q+ , ∀ u ∈ D;
(iv) v ∈ D is a solution to the vector variational inequality: finding v ∈ D such that
〈ξk0(v), (u− v)T 〉 ∈ Rq×q+ , ∀ u ∈ D;
(v) v is a solution to a vector variational inequality: to find v ∈ D such that
〈C(v), (u− v)T 〉 /∈ −int (Rp+)q×q, ∀ u ∈ D;
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(vi) v ∈ D is a solution to a vector variational inequality: to find v ∈ D such that
〈C(v), (u− v)T 〉 ∈ (Rp+)q×q, ∀ u ∈ D.
Then, we have the following relations:
(iii) ⇐⇒
Corollary 3.3
(v)
Theorem 2.1 ⇑ ⇑ Theorem 3.5
(i) ⇐⇒
Theorem 3.1
(ii)
Theorem 2.2 ⇑ ⇑ Theorem 3.6
(iv) ⇐⇒
Theorem 3.2
(vi)
4 Conclusions
The focus of the paper is to decide on the delivery paths of shipping q products between
manufacturers and retailers in a supply-demand network based on a single criterion and
multiple criteria, respectively. Based on Wardrop’s equilibrium principle, we have consid-
ered Henig efficiency of a scalar multi-product network equilibrium model and a vector
one for the supply-demand network. We have also derived a sufficient and a necessary con-
dition for a Henig equilibrium pattern flow for multi-product network equilibrium models
in terms of vector variational inequalities when the cost function is defined in a certain
form. Given that vector variational inequalities have been proven useful for algorithm de-
sign, these results provide a viable approach to solving Henig efficiency of a multi-product
network equilibrium problem.
In this paper we have established a sufficient and a necessary condition for a Henig
equilibrium pattern flow for multi-product network equilibrium models in terms of vector
variational inequalities. We have not been able to derive a condition that are both nec-
essary and sufficient. It is worth noting that there exists no such result in the literature.
That is, the question of a solution to what kind of vector variation inequalities is also a
Henig equilibrium pattern flow for multi-product network equilibrium models is yet to be
answered.
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